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March 18, 2009.1. INTRODUCTION
South Asia remains home to the largest number of working
children in the world. A conservative estimate is that some 20–
30 million live in five large South Asian countries. But on an
average, the percentage of working children in the age group
5–14 varies between 5% and 42% in five major countries in
South Asia: Bangladesh: 19%, India: 5%, Nepal: 42%, and
Pakistan: 8%. India leads in terms of total number of child
laborers. According to the population census of India
(2001), around 12.6 million child laborers below 14 years of
age work in India. For Uttar Pradesh which is one of the In-
dian states where the carpet industry plays a prominent role,
the National Sample Survey (2004–05) in India reports that
there were more than a million child laborers. Deborah, An-
ker, Ashraf, and Barge (1998) estimate that in the Indian
hand-knotted carpet industry about 22% of the total work-
force consist of children which is equal to as many as
130,000 children. A more recent study by Sharma (2003) pro-
vides estimates of the incidence of child labor in both looms
under social labeling and non-labeling. The incidence of child
labor in looms not covered under any social labeling initiative
is estimated to amount to about 24% while this varied between
7% to close to 18% in looms covered under social labeling ini-
tiatives.
The extent of child labor in Nepal is more severe than in In-
dia. There, the incidence of child labor is similar to that of
Sub-Saharan Africa where the highest proportion of working
children exists. The estimates show that almost one child in
three below the age of 15 is economically active in Nepal.
According to Gilligan (2003), each child laborer is a tangible
living symbol of a vulnerable and marginalized family in
Nepal, and two million children aged 5–14 are classified as em-
ployed in Nepal. In a study by the Child Workers in Nepal
Concerned Center (CWIN, 1993) from the early nineties, 365
carpet factories within the Kathmandu Valley were surveyed,
and it was estimated that about 50% of the total 300,000
laborers were children. A more recent study by ILO (2002)
estimated that about 7,700 or 12% of the total 64,300 laborers1683were child laborers in the carpet firms of the Kathmandu
Valley. Charle´ (2003) mentions that an estimated 1,800 chil-
dren under the age of 14 are illegally employed by Nepal’s
carpet industry.
In order to reduce the occurrence of child labor in the carpet
industry, measures and initiatives such as ‘‘Social Labeling” or
‘‘Codes of Conducts” have been proposed and developed in
the recent past. Social labeling acts as a signal in the market,
informing consumers about the social conditions of produc-
tion, and assuring them that the item or service they purchase
is produced under equitable working conditions (Hilowitz,
1997). It is praised as a market based and voluntary, and
therefore a more attractive instrument to raise labor standards
(Basu, Chau, & Grote, 2006). Thus, non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) such as the Rugmark Foundation, Care &
Fair, or STEP were established in the mid-nineties to encour-
age manufacturers of hand-knotted carpets to produce them
without child labor. The Rugmark Foundation, established
by ‘‘Brot fu¨r die Welt,” ‘‘Misereor,” ‘‘terre des hommes,”
and UNICEF in 1995, aims at eliminating the employment
of children in the carpet industry by assigning the Rugmark la-
bel to carpets made without child labor. Most Rugmark car-
pets are shipped to Germany which accounts for 30% of the
hand-knotted carpet imports from India (US Department of
Labor, 1997). Care & Fair is an association established by
the German federation of carpet importers. While the NGOs
differ in their approaches and objectives, they operate within
a broader common goal—the removal of child labor. The
common basic goals of the NGOs are to eliminate child labor
from the hand-knotted carpets and also to rehabilitate the
former child carpet workers.
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themselves to ensure that the label’s requirements are fulfilled.
In contrast, Kaleen and STEP hire external agencies to mon-
itor, thus contributing to an increased trustworthiness of the
label. Care & Fair is abstaining from monitoring. While Rug-
mark and Kaleen label individual products, STEP and Care &
Fair label the company as a whole. In accordance with its phi-
losophy, Care & Fair India runs hospitals to provide health
care to the carpet weavers and workers. The Rugmark initia-
tive has mobile clinical facilities to provide health care to the
households, and they also provide some health benefits in their
rehabilitation centers. There are some schools and adult edu-
cation centers constructed and managed by Rugmark for a
better opportunity of child schooling and adult training
throughout the carpet weaving areas. These supply side ac-
tions in the child labor market, as provided by social labeling
NGOs, are very important to address the child labor problem.
To finance these initiatives, licensed exporters have to con-
tribute 0.25% of the fob price to the Rugmark foundation
(Sharma, 2003). Importers who join the program contribute
1.75% of the costs of the rugs (Charle´, 2003).
Although the issue of child labor ranks high in the interna-
tional trade policy debates, there has been relatively little
empirical work on it so far. This empirical study analyzes
how social labeling affects the labor force status and schooling
of children. It focuses on the labeling program Rugmark
which has been in operation now for about 10 years in India
and Nepal. Understanding the effects of social labeling on
child labor and schooling is crucial, as it is expected to increase
human capital accumulation which again is one of the main
prerequisites for long-term growth. The results of this research
also contribute to a better understanding of whether the mar-
keting signals carried by the logos of labeling NGOs are able
to reduce child labor or not.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of the theoretical and empirical literature related to
child labor and social labeling. Based on the literature review,
some hypotheses are derived for empirical testing. Section 3
describes survey sampling, stratification techniques, and the
econometric model used in the study for India and Nepal.
The results of the econometric analyses are presented in Sec-
tion 4, and Section 5 concludes.2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Comprehensive literature reviews related to child labor have
been provided, for example, by Basu (1999), Brown,
Deardorff, and Stern (2002), Cigno and Rosati (2005) or by
Edmonds (2007). This review focuses on two specific aspects
which are related to child labor and which are of particular
interest in the context of this article: these are the effects of
globalization and trade liberalization on child labor and the
impact of social labeling on child labor. The major empirical
and theoretical studies will be presented reflecting some of
the main arguments raised in the child labor literature. The
strand of literature highlighting the link between globalization
and the incidence of child labor is of importance in the context
of this article since carpet weaving—a business which is sus-
ceptible to child labor—takes place in the developing countries
with its products being consumed in the developed countries.
Globalization affecting the carpet business is thus likely to im-
pact on the occurrence of child labor. The second strand of lit-
erature being of interest relates to demand-side measures:
these refer in particular to social labeling which is often com-
plemented by other demand-side measures such as schoolingor provision of health care centers. Finally, some hypotheses
have been derived from the literature which will be tested
empirically in Section 4.
(a) Globalization and the incidence of child labor
In recent years, a discussion about the impact of globalization
and trade liberalization on the incidence of child labor has
started in the literature. Maskus (1997) develops a theoretical
model of an economy that produces an export- and import-com-
peting goodwith some sector-specific factors. Child labor is em-
ployed only in the informal sector supplying inputs to the export
sector. Taking globalization as an expanded opportunity to en-
gage in the international trade, a larger export sector will raise
the demand for child labor inputs which again will be accompa-
nied by a rise in the child’s wage. It can be concluded that the rise
in the child’s wage will raise the return to work relative to the re-
turn to education, thus leading to increased child labor.
Basu and Van (1998) and Basu (2002) model a family in
which altruistic parents withdraw their children from the labor
force once adult wages reach some critical level. Consequently,
the supply of labor begins to bend back. Once child labor has
been reduced to zero, the supply of labor resumes its upward
slope. There are then two stable equilibria: a low-wage equilib-
rium characterized by child labor and a high-wage equilibrium
in which all children are attending school. Developing coun-
tries may be stuck in this low-wage child labor trap. However,
trade openness may help families approach or even exceed the
critical adult-wage level at which child labor begins to decline.
Apart from these theoretical papers, there are also a number
of empirical ones investigating the link between globalization
and child labor. Neumayer and de Soysa (2005) argue that
countries being more open toward trade and/or having a
higher stock of foreign direct investment also have a lower inci-
dence of child labor. They conclude that globalization is asso-
ciated with less, not more, child labor. Edmonds and Pavcnik
(2006) explore the relationship between greater exposure to
trade and child labor in a cross country setting. They account
for the fact that trade flows are endogenous to child labor by
investigating the relationship between child labor and variation
in trade based on geography. They find that countries that
trade more have less child labor. Cigno, Rosati, and Guarcello
(2002) also find no empirical evidence that globalization per se
increases child labor. Consistent with the trade theory and
household economics, they find a comparatively well-educated
workforce, as well as active social policies, to inevitably leading
to a reduction in child labor. According to them, for countries
with a largely uneducated labor force, the problem is not so
much globalization, as being allowed to take part in it.
In an empirical study on Vietnam, Edmonds and Pavcnik
(2005) analyzed the effect of liberalized rice trade. They find
that despite greater employment opportunities, children in
households that benefit from higher rice prices are much less
likely to work. Contrary to this, Kruger (2007) tested in a
more recent study in Brazil how increases in the country-level
value of coffee production affect child labor. She finds that in-
creases in the value of coffee production lead to more children
being withdrawn from schools and sent to work. Thus, she
concludes that during periods of economic growth, education
of the poor may be adversely affected.
(b) Social labeling and child labor
The literature related to social labeling and child labor is just
evolving, and mainly restricted to theoretical articles. Basu,
Chau, and Grote (2006) provide a theoretical model of
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on the four often-noted objectives: child labor employment,
consumer information, welfare, and trade linkages. They high-
light the market responses to social labeling when product
market competition between the North and South is based
on both comparative cost advantage and the use of child labor
as a hidden product attribute. They find that consumers and
Southern producers benefit, while children and Northern pro-
ducers are worse off. Trade sanctions on unlabeled products
deteriorate Southern terms of trade, but do not affect the inci-
dence of child labor in any way. Furthermore, a threat to sanc-
tion the import of unlabeled Southern products discourages
the South from maintaining a credible social labeling program.
In general, the level of monitoring in place critically deter-
mines the employment effects of social labeling.
A different model is offered by Baland and Duprez (2007).
They find that when most producers in the South are eligible
to obtain the label, its effectiveness is considerably reduced
by a displacement effect. This effect implies that adult laborers
replace child laborers in the export sector, while child laborers
replace adult laborers in the domestic sector. The label is then
not able to create a price premium for the labeled goods as
compared with unlabeled goods. However, when there is only
a small fraction of producers with access to the label, then the
labeled producers generally gain as opposed to the losing non-
labeled producers. The impact on child labor is in general
ambiguous, depending on the strength of the income and sub-
stitution effects.
Brown (2006) theoretically analyzes the economic mechanics
and consequences of product labeling. When product labeling
is applied to child labor, she finds that even in the optimistic
case in which consumers pay a labeling premium that exceeds
the additional cost of adult-only technology, there is no net
reduction in the labor force participation of children. Children
are better off only when the price premium (i.e., a transfer
from the consumers in the North to the children in the South)
is used for their benefit.
Besides these theoretical papers, there are a number of
empirical papers highlighting selected policy issues. Thus, Hur-
tado (2002) discusses the legality of government-sponsored so-
cial labeling initiatives under WTO agreements. He first
presents the basic characteristics, potentials, and shortcomings
of labeling initiatives and then suggests a drive toward govern-
ment sponsorship as a way to correct the shortcomings. He
then moves on to analyze these initiatives under the relevant
GATT and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement pro-
visions. Hilowitz (1997) discusses various issues related to vol-
untary social labeling with reference to child labor. Six
initiatives are described and some examples are given for spe-
cific instances of labeling. Sharma (2003) examines the impacts
of the labeling initiatives vis-a`-vis child labor. He looks at
working mechanisms of labeling NGOs and highlights the ma-
jor strengths and weaknesses of social labeling.
It can be summarized from the literature review that there is
no clearcut evidence on how globalization in general and so-
cial labeling in particular impact on child labor. The theoreti-
cal as well as the empirical literature comes to ambiguous
results on the possible outcomes for working children and
their families. However, it also leads to some concrete hypoth-
eses which can be empirically tested and which will be further
explained in the following.
(c) Selected hypotheses on child labor
The effectiveness of labeling products in terms of reducing
child labor depends to a large extent on the links betweenhousehold income or calorie intake and child labor. This spe-
cific aspect will be included in the empirical part of this paper
by testing two major hypotheses. One essential hypothesis
which is drawn from the above-mentioned Basu and Van
(1998) model is called the ‘‘luxury hypothesis.” It implies that
a household would not send its children to work if its income
from non-child labor sources were sufficiently high. Therefore,
if adult wage/income increases, the probability of the inci-
dence of child labor decreases and vice versa. Assuming paren-
tal altruism, child labor is due to parents’ low income. Based
on the luxury hypothesis, it might be well argued that children
stop working once a household exceeds the subsistence level in
terms of calorie intake.
A larger calorie intake reduces the number of required
breaks or leisure time and thereby increases the number of po-
tential working hours (Hemmer, 1979). This ‘‘nutritional effi-
ciency wage argument” explains a situation where income
elasticity of leisure or schooling is negative (inferior good)
assuming that income equals consumption. In other words, a
certain minimum calorie intake is absolutely necessary for
100% efficiency, and if this requirement is only partially met
or not met at all, the worker is insufficiently productive or
incapable of continuing work (Hemmer, 1979; Subramanian
& Deaton, 1996). The development literature shows that there
is a functional relationship between nutrition and productivity
leading to the nutritional efficiency wage argument (Bliss &
Stern, 1978; Leibenstein,1957; Stiglitz, 1976). According to
this argument, a larger calorie intake reduces the number of
required breaks or leisure time and thereby increases the num-
ber of potential working hours. Therefore, low wage results in
low consumption and, thereby lowering labor productivity;
paying a lower wage may raise the cost per efficiency unit of
labor (Swamy, 1997).
At very low levels of income and hence nutrition (below-
subsistence), the effort that household members (including
children) are able to exert may be positively influenced by an
increase of calorie intake as long as the household reaches
the subsistence level. Therefore, the below-subsistence house-
holds might send their children to work in order to be able
to reach the subsistence level. This result is obviously an obsta-
cle for social labeling NGOs since it would mean that labeling
does not have any impact on poorer households living below
the subsistence level. Based on this line of argument, the whole
sample in this study was subdivided into two groups based on
a certain poverty threshold to test the nutrition-based effi-
ciency wage model.3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In the following, the sampling procedure and the stratifica-
tion technique based on which the primary data from the car-
pet industry in Nepal and India were collected, as well as the
econometric model are outlined.
(a) Survey Sampling
In 2005, primary data were collected from 415 households in
Uttar Pradesh, India and from 410 households from Kath-
mandu Valley, Nepal. In order to decrease the variances and
therefore to increase the efficiency of the tests and the preci-
sion of the estimators, it was necessary to control for the influ-
ence of confounding variables which might lead to the
heterogeneity problem, thus disturbing the main analysis. This
was done by partitioning the population with respect to the
following three main factors:
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ii. Status of the households with children (labeling or not).
iii. Important time points (e.g., before and after NGOs
came into operation (before and after 1995)).
Within Uttar Pradesh and Kathmandu valley, this research
followed the plan of stratifying in sub-spatial partitions, that
is, by taking an independent random sample from each of
the three sub-regions of Uttar Pradesh (see Appendix A)
and Kathmandu Valley (see Appendix B). To account for re-
gional differences the survey site was chosen on the basis of
concentrated carpet firms in three districts of Eastern India
namely Mirzapur, Bhadohi, and Varanasi and in three dis-
tricts of Kathmandu Valley namely Kathmandu, Lalitpur,
and Bhaktapur.
The major challenge of the field research for this study was
locating the stratified households and getting a large enough
sample size, so that a reasonable degree of confidence could
be reached with statistically significant results. Stratifying the
sample included (i) identifying the carpet enterprises which
were registered by the labeling NGO Rugmark, and (ii) differ-
entiating between labeling and non-labeling households. To
compare the situation of labeling and non-labeling house-
holds, approximately 50% of the surveyed households were
classified as Rugmark producers whereas the other 50% did
not in any way relate to Rugmark or any other labeling pro-
gram. In the case of Nepal, a labeling household was defined
as a household where at least one person was working in firms
registered by labeling NGOs and no member was working in
other non-labeling carpet firms. A non-labeling household
was defined as a household where at least one member was
working in the unregistered (non-labeled) carpet firm and no
member of this household was working in a registered (la-
beled) carpet firm. Based on the lists from Rugmark, some
households from the labeled carpet firms were selected next
to households from the non-labeled carpet firms from the
same area. In the case of India, a labeling household was de-
fined based on whether the head of the household knew about
the main objective of labeling NGOs. 1
It needs to be pointed out that it is not the head of the
household or parent of a child who decides to work for Rug-
mark or any other labeling program. It is rather the exporter
of the carpets who decides whether he or she gets involved in
the trade with Rugmark-labeled carpets. The exporter then in-
forms his or her wholesaler who again informs the carpet loom
owners about the prerequisites and requirements of the Rug-
mark label—with different levels of efficiency. Hence, the deci-
sion of joining a labeling program is not taken by the
household and the knowledge about Rugmark depends to a
large extent on the information flow along the value chain;
therefore, taking a random sample of labeling and non-label-
ing households does not lead to any sample selection bias,
and also the identification problem of the analysis can be
avoided.
(b) Econometric methodology
To determine the factors which lead to child labor and to
test empirically whether the luxury hypothesis as well as the
nutritional efficiency wage argument is valid, binary multiple
logistic regression is used to estimate the probability that a
child is being employed in the following way:
LogitðP Þ ¼ ln P
1 P ¼ aþ b
0X ð1Þ
where P is the probability (Child is employed | X); a is the
intercept parameter; b is the vector of slope parameters; andX is the vector of explanatory variables.The null hypothesis
is b = 0. The explanatory variables (XH) describe household
characteristics. A description of the variables used for the
econometric analysis is provided in Table 1.
To be able to test the efficiency wage argument, the house-
holds were divided into two groups based on their nutritional
status: one group is below subsistence and the other group is
above subsistence in terms of calorie consumption. It is as-
sumed that there is a threshold level of energy intake X* below
which the households send their children to work. This is be-
cause their adult per capita productivity is so low that they de-
pend on their children’s salary to secure their basic energy
requirements. A person is counted as ‘‘food poor” if the nutri-
tional content of the food(s) he or she consumes is less than
the prescribed threshold X*. As a simplifying assumption,
most countries use dietary energy as a proxy for the overall
nutritional status, that is, if a person gets enough energy, then
he or she also gets adequate protein and the other essential
nutrients (David & Joshua, 2005).
Edmonds (2005) defines ‘‘poorest households” as house-
holds with a per capita expenditure below of what is needed
to purchase 2100 calories per day. But per capita calorie
requirements at minimum activity levels differ according to
age, gender, weight, etc. For own calculations this study fol-
lows a scale from the World Health Organization as used by
Babu (no year). Calorie requirement is then defined according
to age and gender assuming a fixed weight (gender basis) and
basal metabolic rate. Cultural factors can also deprive mem-
bers of the household (i.e., women and children) from getting
an equitable share. However, it is assumed in this study that
household members’ strong family ties would ensure that food
is shared equally.
The data which are needed to calculate the per capita calo-
ries consumed by the members of the households are obtained
via a 24 h recall from all members of the household. The total
energy consumption
P
kcal of each sample household is de-
rived from the net amounts of food commodities consumed,
converted into energy and different micronutrients. Per capita
values are generated by dividing
P
kcal by the number of con-
suming members in the households in the last 24 h taking the
different calorie needs of individual household members into
account. The subsistence level is then calculated by the differ-
ence between per capita calories consumed by a household and
the per capita calories required for a household. If the sign is
negative, the household is below the subsistence level or clas-
sified as (calorie) non-poor, and vice versa.4. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
In the following, the econometric results obtained from ana-
lyzing the collected primary data on social labeling issues are
presented. More in detail, the luxury hypothesis and the nutri-
tion efficiency wage argument are tested. Moreover, the mon-
itoring of social labeling is further investigated due to its
importance with respect to the overall trustworthiness of such
programs.
(a) The luxury hypothesis and determinants of child labor supply
The results of testing the influence of variables on the chance
of being a child laborer at the household level are shown in
Tables 2 and 3 for Nepal and India, respectively. The labeling
status of a household has been found to be an important fac-
tor in determining whether a child works or not. The labeling
status is ‘‘yes” if a member of the household works in a labeled
Table 2. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in Nepal
Analysis of maximum likelihood estimates Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points estimate 90% Confidence
limits
Intercept 0.79
HH LabelInd Registered versus Unregistered 0.37 *** 0.48 0.30 0.77
HH IsAbsDolPov No versus Yes 0.82 5.10 0.93 28.1
HH HoHSex Female versus Male 0.15 0.74 0.30 1.87
HH HoHEdu Primary education 0.39 ** 0.46 0.27 0.79
vs. No education
HH IncGT14 0.78 ** 0.46 0.26 0.82
HH NoChildren 1.30 *** 3.69 2.45 5.54
HH Debts 0.15 * 1.16 1.00 1.33
HH HoHAge 0.22 ** 1.24 1.05 1.46
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.27 *** 0.28 0.20 0.39
HH Size 0.42 *** 0.66 0.51 0.85
Note: dependent variable: ‘‘HH IsAnyChildLab” (Yes/No), (household level, N = 410).
* Significant at 10%.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 1. Variable definitions used for econometric analysis
Variable name Variable description Type of the variable
HH Id Household Id Key
HH HoHAge Age of the head of household Continuous
HH HoHSex Gender of the head of household Binary Categorical
HH HoHEdu Education of the head of household Categorical
HH Size Actual total permanent members of the household Continuous
HH IncGT14 Last month total income of family members older than 14 Continuous
HH Debts Actual total outstanding debts incl. interest and costs Continuous
HH NoChildren Total number of children (P14) Continuous
HH LabelInd Is anybody of the family working in a labeled industry? Binary Categorical
HH absolutePov Households with less than US$ 1 per day (Absolute poverty) Binary Categorical
HH IsAnyChildLab At least one child has been working in the last two months either full time or part time Binary Categorical
HH KalPC Per capita calorie intake Continuous
HH NoChildrenSchool Total number of school going children Continuous
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The knowledge about labeling NGOs is ‘‘yes” if the head of
the household is well informed about the objective of Rug-
mark. Tables 2 and 3 show that for each household, the mag-
nitude of the estimated child labor decreases with labeling
NGO’s intervention. The estimated odds ratio of the labeling
status is 0.48 2 for the household-wise regression in Nepal.
This means, that the odds of having a child laborer in the fam-
ily not being assisted by an NGO are more than 2 times 3 the
odds of having a child laborer in an NGO-assisted family in
Nepal. In India, the estimated odds ratio of the labeling status
is 0.58 4 for the household-wise regression. This means, that
the odds of having a child laborer in the family who has no
knowledge of labeling NGOs are more than 72% 5 of the odds
of having a child laborer in a family who has NGO knowledge.
Therefore, in both countries the probability of child labor in-
creases in the carpet firm when the household is not involved
with labeling NGOs.
Following the luxury hypothesis of Basu and Van (1998),
this study tests whether there is a negative relationship be-
tween child labor and adult income (‘‘HH IncGT14” scaled
adult’s income in 5,000 Rupies). It can be concluded that the
sign and the statistical significance of the estimated adult in-
come coefficient support the Basu & Van model in the Nepali
case but reject the hypothesis in the context of India. The esti-
mated odds ratio for adult income is 0.46 in the household le-vel regression in Nepal. This means, that for each additional
5,000 Rupies increase in adult income, the odds for child labor
decrease by more than half (44%) at the household level. This
shows a strong and a negative association between the adult
income and the child labor in the household. Though the
direction of the impact of adult income on child labor is the
same for both countries, adult income has no significant influ-
ence on child labor in the carpet belt of India.
In the household level regression, there is a positive correla-
tion between child employment and family debts (‘‘HH
Debts”: scaled household’s debt in 5,000 Rupies) but it is
significant only in Nepal and nearly significant in India 6. This
means that the odds of child employment are increased by
around 16% if the debt burden of the household rises by
5,000 Rupies in Nepal.
Improvement in the head of the household’s education
(‘‘HH HoHEdu”) decreases the probability of a child’s
employment in the labor market. This is confirmed by the neg-
ative and significant estimates of the odds ratio of ‘‘at least pri-
mary education” and ‘‘no education” in the household level
regression in Nepal but it is not significant in India. The esti-
mated odds ratio for ‘‘head of the household’s education” is
0.46 in the family-wise regression. This means that the odds
of child labor are about 54% lower for those households and
children where the head of the household completed at least
primary school compared with those households where the
Table 3. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in India
Analysis of maximum likelihood estimates Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points estimate 90% Confidence
limits
Intercept 0.55
HH LabelInd NGO knowledge versus no NGO knowledge 0.27 *** 0.58 0.37 0.90
HH HoH Sex Female versus male 0.02 1.03 0.46 2.29
HH HoH Edu Primary education versus no education 0.12 0.79 0.49 1.29
HH IncGT14 0.03 0.97 0.84 1.12
HH NoChildren 0.85 *** 2.35 1.74 3.18
HH Debts 0.01 1.01 0.99 1.03
HH HoHAge 0.05 1.05 0.90 1.23
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.26 *** 0.28 0.21 0.37
HH Size 0.23 * 0.79 0.63 0.99
Note: dependent variable: ’HH IsAnyChildLab’ (Yes/No), (household level, N = 415).
* Significant at 10%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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a strong and a negative association between the education sta-
tus of the head of the household and child labor in Nepal.
The age of the head of the household (‘‘HH HoHAge”:
scaled head of the household’s age in 5 years of age) shows
a significant and a positive effect on child labor supply in the
household level regression for Nepal. The use of children as
a form of insurance (Po¨rtner, 2001) also provides some insight
into the role of the ‘‘age of the head of the household” in
determining child labor. The idea behind this might be that
the older the head of the household is, the more will he or
she be aware of his/her dependency for livelihood in the fu-
ture. Child laborers could be seen as an ‘‘economic insurance”
in old age for the head of the household. Thus, the probability
of a child to work is increasing with the age of the household
head. The estimated odds ratio for ‘‘age of the head of the
household” is 1.24, which means that the odds of child labor
are 24% higher for each 5 years increase in the age of the
household head. This shows a positive association between
the age of the head of the household and child labor in Nepal
which is not significant in India.
The sign of the coefficient of the size of a household ‘‘HH
Size” shows that with an increase in the household size, the
probability of child labor decreases in both India and Nepal.
This is contrary to what would have been expected, however,
it might be explained by an increased number of adults—and
not children—in the household. In fact, the more adults there
are in the household, the less likely it is that a child works. The
variable ‘‘total number of children” (‘‘HH NoChildren”),
however, shows a statistically significant and positive relation
with the occurrence of child labor in India and Nepal. This
indicates that the higher the number of children in a house-
hold, the more likely it is that some children of this family will
go to work.
The estimated odds ratio for ‘‘total number of children” is
3.69 for Nepal and is 2.3 for India which means that the like-
lihood (odds) of a child to work increases by the factor 3.7
(Nepal) and 2.3 (India) for each additional child in the house-
hold. This shows a strong and positive association between
‘‘total number of children” in a family and the probability
of child labor, which is described frequently in the literature
(Patrinos & Psacharopoulos, 1995). In other words, the higher
the probability that a child will work, the higher the probabil-
ity of an additional birth in the household (Cigno & Rosati,
2002).(b) Social labeling and the nutritional efficiency wage argument
Tables 4–7 present the coefficient estimates of the logit
regressions of child labor participation for two different
groups of households (above and below subsistence) in India
and Nepal. First of all, important differences are derived from
the calorie intake (HH KalPC) of the two household groups.
In the above-subsistence level households, the relationship
between the calorie intake and the child labor is negative
and not significant (see Table 4 for India and Table 5 for
Nepal). This implies that a child living in an above-subsistence
household group is less likely to work, when his or her calorie
intake increases.
For the very poor households, however, the estimated odds
ratio for the per capita calorie intake is 1.53 in India (see Table
6), while in Nepal, it is 5.31 (see Table 7). This means, that for
each additional increase of 500 kcal in the family consump-
tion, the odds for child labor increase by 53% in India and
more than 5 times in Nepal. Thus, the statistical significance
of the ‘‘calorie intake” coefficient in the below-subsistence
households suggests a significant growth in child employment
with an increased calorie intake. This result supports the ‘‘effi-
ciency wage argument,” showing that when calorie intake goes
up, children are healthier, work more hours and get better
paid and contribute more income to their families
(Leibenstein, 1957). Therefore, the statistically significant
poverty trap under the subsistence level stimulates child labor.
The following important questions arise from this result: can
social labeling NGOs have an impact through their welfare
activities on the very poor households? Are they able to release
the poorest households from the poverty trap? In fact, what has
been found in this study is that in both groups, the labeling sta-
tus of the households (HHLabelInd) leads to a decrease in child
labor. However, the statistical significance of the coefficient is
different in the below- and above-subsistence regressions.While
for the very poor households, no significant influence by the
labeling status is found, the odds of a child to work in labeling
households are 90% lower in the case of India and are 53% lower
in the case of Nepal in the above-subsistence group. Thus, while
the labeling NGOs could increase household’s welfare, they
could not neutralize or reduce the effect of the ‘‘food poverty
trap” in the below-subsistence households.
It can be concluded, that labeling NGOs are successful in
removing child labor in the above-subsistence households, a
group for which the nutritional efficiency wage argument does
Table 4. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in India, households who are above the subsistence level
Analysis of maximum likelihood Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points Estimate 90% Confidence
Limits
HH LabelInd NGO knowledge versus no NGO knowledge 1.15 ** 0.10 0.01 0.77
HH HoHSex Female versus male 0.88 0.17 0.01 2.86
HH HoHEdu Primary education versus no education 1.22 0.08 0.001 274.827
HH KalPC 0.84 0.43 0.10 1.74
HH NoChildren 2.68 *** 14.60 2.66 80.12
HH Debts 0.01 1.01 0.96 1.06
HH HoHAge 0.97 *** 2.65 1.29 5.46
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.90 *** 0.15 0.05 0.46
HH Size 2.31 *** 0.09 0.02 0.46
Note: dependent variable: HH IsAnyChild0514Lab, household level, N = 133.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 5. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in Nepal, households who are above the subsistence level
Analysis of maximum likelihood Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points estimate 90% Confidence
limits
HH LabelInd Registered versus unregistered 0.37 ** 0.47 0.26 0.86
HH IsAbsDolPov No versus Yes 0.14 0.76 0.16 3.66
HH HoHSex Female versus male 0.05 1.13 0.30 4.27
HH HoHEdu Primary education versus no education 0.47 ** 0.39 0.19 0.79
HH KalPC 0.37 1.45 0.98 2.14
HH NoChildren 1.65 *** 5.22 3.19 8.56
HH Debts 0.17 1.18 0.93 1.52
HH HoHAge 0.11 1.12 0.91 1.37
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.39 *** 0.25 0.16 0.38
HH Size 0.71 *** 0.49 0.36 0.68
Note: dependent variable: HH IsAnyChild0514Lab, household level, N = 290.
** Significant at 5%.
*** Significant at 1%.
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holds are engaged in economic activities because of the subsis-
tence trap due to the nutritional efficiency wage argument. The
labeling status of the below-subsistence household has no sig-
nificant impact on a child’s working status.
(c) Monitoring frequency and child labor
One of the main factors, which influences the success of label-
ing products, is ‘‘monitoring frequency.” In the above section,
‘‘monitoring frequency” was not considered as an explanatory
variable because of the high collinearity with ‘‘HH LabelInd”
(Is anybody of the family working in a labeled firm?).
Rugmark has its own inspection and random monitoring
system of its member’s loom. It would be important to answer
the question: is there any association between monitoring by
the labeling NGOs and child laborers working in a carpet
firm? It is hypothesized that the presence of a monitoring strat-
egy by the labeling NGOs decreases the incidence of child la-
bor in carpet firms.Tables 8 and 9 represent a 2  2 contingency table for India
and Nepal, cross classifying the child laborer’s monitoring sta-
tus and the full time working status for more than 20 days
within the last two months. Here, child labor is a response var-
iable and monitoring is an explanatory variable. We therefore
study the conditional distributions of child labor, given the
monitoring status. The proportions (25.4% for child labor,
and 74.6% for no child labor in Nepal; 29.8% for child labor
and 70.1% for no child labor in India) are non-monitoring
sample conditional distributions of child labor. For positive
monitoring, the sample conditional distributions are 9%
(Nepal) and 27.4% (India) for child labor and 91% (Nepal)
and 72.5% (India) for no child labor.
The sample relative risk 7 is 2.78 for Nepal and 1.08 for In-
dia, that is, the sample proportion of child laborer with no
monitoring is 2.78 times the proportion of positive monitoring
cases in Nepal and the sample proportion of child laborer with
no monitoring is 8% the proportion of positive monitoring
cases in India. The estimated relative risk means that the prob-
ability of child labor is higher for those with no monitoring
Table 7. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in Nepal, households who are below the subsistence level
Analysis of maximum likelihood Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points estimate 90% Confidence
limits
HH LabelInd Registered versus unregistered 0.40 0.45 0.17 1.22
HH HoHSex Female versus male 0.87 0.18 0.023 1.36
HH HoHEdu Primary education versus no education 0.32 0.53 0.17 1.59
HH KalPC 1.67 *** 5.31 1.69 16.67
HH NoChildren 1.40 *** 4.47 1.84 10.83
HH Debts 0.28 * 1.33 1.01 1.74
HH HoHAge 0.43 * 1.54 1.03 2.29
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.71 *** 0.18 0.084 0.38
HH Size 0.32 073 0.38 1.43
Note: dependent variable: HH IsAnyChild0514Lab, household level, N = 120.
* Significant at 10%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 6. Logit regression results for the probability of child labor in India, households who are below the subsistence level
Analysis of maximum likelihood Odds ratio estimates
Parameters Estimate Points estimate 90% Confidence
limits
HH LabelInd NGO knowledge versus no NGO knowledge 0.23 0.63 0.39 1.02
HH HoHSex Female versus male 0.21 1.52 0.59 3.92
HH HoHEdu Primary education versus no education 0.11 0.81 0.48 1.33
HH KalPC 0.43 * 1.53 1.01 2.30
HH NoChildren 0.67 *** 1.95 1.42 2.70
HH Debts 0.01 1.01 0.99 1.03
HH HoHAge 0.04 0.95 0.80 1.13
HH NoChildrenSchool 1.18 *** 0.31 0.23 0.41
HH Size 0.09 091 0.71 1.16
Note: dependent variable: HH IsAnyChild0514Lab, household level, N = 282.
* Significant at 10%.
*** Significant at 1%.
Table 8. Cross tabulation of monitoring status and child labor in India
Monitoring within last
two months by labeling NGO
Child labor
Yes No Total
No 174 409 330
29.8% 70.1 100.0%
Yes 47 124 79
27.4% 72.5% 100.0%
Total 221 533 754
29.3% 70.7% 100.0%
1690 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthan for those with monitoring. With respect to monitoring, it
was also observed, that Rugmark inspectors took initiative to
monitor the weaving of carpets but not the other intermediate
sectors such as washing, dyeing, and spinning carpets. Thus, a
number of children were found to be working in the spinning
firm.5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The intervention of social labeling NGOs leads to an
improvement in the welfare of children and households in-
volved in the carpet firms. Thus, social labeling has been foundto be an effective way of combating child labor. However, this
is only true for the above-subsistence households, but not for
the very poor households living below the subsistence level.
Therefore, any policy to curb child labor should be aimed first
at increasing the income of the below-subsistence group of
households who are the most vulnerable in society.
In the above-subsistence group of households, the calorie in-
take does not determine whether children work or not. There-
fore, labeling NGOs are successful to remove child labor by
their welfare activities. However, in the below-subsistence
households, calorie intake increases child labor because of
the nutritional efficiency wage argument. Hence, labeling
NGOs have no significant influence on the reduction of child
labor supply in this group. The rationale behind this finding
is that any welfare enhancing policy by labeling NGOs could
directly or indirectly increase the nutrition level of the be-
low-subsistence household members. 8 This implies that chil-
dren are healthier, work more hours, and get better paid and
contribute more to their family’s income to reach the subsis-
tence level. Since child leisure is a luxury item, the demand
for it is higher in the above-subsistence group than in the be-
low-subsistence group.
It essentially implies that eradicating child labor through so-
cial labeling would be successful if the national government
could ensure basic consumption needs (at least the subsistence
Table 9. Cross tabulation of monitoring status and child labor in Nepal
Monitoring within last
two months by labeling NGO
Child labor
Yes No Total
No 114 334 448
25.4% 74.6% 100.0%
Yes 9 91 100
9.0% 91.0% 100.0%
Total 123 425 548
22.4% 77.6% 100.0%
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tions of non-trade policies should be formulated by interven-
ing through nutrition programs (food for education, food
stamps, and food rationing) that allow a family to get over
the subsistence trap. Above a certain level of nutrition (subsis-
tence level), the households respond positively to the objective
of labeling NGOs, that is, to decrease child labor supply.
Overall, frequent monitoring by labeling NGOs was found
to have a positive effect on the reduction of child labor. How-
ever, there is always the danger that households who are dri-
ven by food poverty either shift their children to less visible
sectors (e.g., from carpets to handicrafts), or across the pro-
duction chain (e.g., from weaving to spinning), or move into
the informal sector where conditions are likely to be more
exploitative. In fact, it was found that a number of children
are moved to the intermediate sector of carpet production,
such as the spinning industry which is not monitored by the
NGOs. Therefore, it is important to also monitor these sectors
which have often more dangerous and hazardous working
conditions than the weaving sector. In addition, the monitor-
ing risk or moral hazard problem in monitoring which is
caused by the large number of looms in the carpet industry
could be avoided by substituting traditional technology with
modern technology.This research estimates a positive correlation between child
employment and family debts which is nearly significant 9 in
India. Mostly the uneducated people feel uncomfortable
going to the institutional credit market due to paper works
and bureaucracy. In addition, the poor people often lack col-
lateral, so that they are not considered as being creditworthy
by government or private banks. This leads to a high demand
for informal credit among the carpet workers. As a result, the
interest rate is very high in the informal credit market.
Among the informal sources, the majority of the households
receive loans from the industry owners, sometimes as an ad-
vance payment. Advance payments make the debtor liable to
finish the work in time in order to receive another advance
payment, and therefore, they use child labor to finish the
work as early as possible. One of the instruments to break
the credit cycle is ‘‘micro credit.” The Grameen Bank model
in Bangladesh might be followed in this regard and child
schooling could be treated as the only ‘‘collateral” of the mi-
cro credit.
In this context it should be noted that the findings of the
regression analysis support the luxury hypothesis by showing
a positive relationship between adult income and child labor
in the Indian carpet industry.
The most important factor in the analysis is the number of
children under 14 years of age in the household; a household
with more children is much more likely to send a child to work
than a household with fewer children. Education is likely to
lead to reduced number of children. Since improvement of
the head of the household’s education significantly decreases
the probability of a child’s employment in the labor market,
adult education can also in this respect play a positive role
in reducing child labor. The age of the head of the household
shows a significant and a positive effect on child labor supply.
Therefore, a micro-insurance policy could resolve the problem
for old parents who might consider every child’s birth as an
insurance against their income loss.NOTES1. In India, the carpet production are scattered into different looms of
households. Sometimes the members of the households have no idea
whether they are belonging to any labeling program. Therefore, a question
was designed whether the head of the household had any idea about the
main objective of Rugmark.
2. In Table 3 the point estimator of the odds ratio of HH LabelInd of
registered versus unregistered is 0.48 which is defined as:
0:481 ¼ odds ðany child in the family workingjany one in family in registered industryÞ
odds ðany child in the family workingjall in family in registered industryÞ3. 2:08 ¼ 1
0:48
:
4. In Table 4 the point estimator of the odds ratio of HH LabelInd of
registered vs. unregistered is 0.58 which is defined as:
0:58 ¼ odds ðany child in the family working=household head has knowledge labeling NGOsÞ
odds ðany child in the family working=household head has knowledge labeling NGOsÞ :5. 1:72 ¼ 1
0:58
:
6. The null hypothesis is true for only 14% cases.
7. Testing this hypothesis allows an estimation of the relative risk as data
were neither sampled nor analyzed retrospectively (Case control).
8. According to Engel’s law the below-subsistence households spend a
larger proportion of their income on food (inferior goods) than the above-
subsistence households.
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY LOCATION IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS OF UTTAR PRADESH (INDIA)
Name of districts Varanasi Mirzapur Bhadohi
Name of the location Chandapur Purjagir Sawalepur
Mahgaon Dengurpatti Pargaaspur






APPENDIX B. SURVEY LOCATION IN DIFFERENT DISTRICTS OF KATHMANDU VALLEY (NEPAL)
Name of districts Kathmandu Lalitpur Bhaktapur
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